environmental NGOs (ENGOs) opposing natural-gas extraction as agents of colonialism, 1 while China and Russia have passed laws to limit the capacity of foreign-affiliated NGOs to campaign on 'political' issues, such as mining and nuclear energy (Nilsen 2017; Phillips 2016) . Egypt and Malaysia have worked to delegitimise NGOs as foreign agents by framing them as seeking to destabilise domestic politics (Borneo Post 2013; Pratt 2013) . India has frozen the bank accounts of ENGOs such as Greenpeace, and blocked foreign funding of civil society organisations (Singh 2015) . Even governments in relatively open democracies, such as Canada during the years of the conservative prime minister Stephen Harper (2006-15) , have framed NGOs opposed to hydrocarbon pipelines as a threat to the national interest (O'Neil 2015) . Indeed, over the past decade, the political discourse of NGOs as foreign agents has grown increasingly common among governments seeking to limit the power of local environmental activists with transnational alliances.
Why have governments labelled civil society organisations as foreign agents? Why are states enacting laws to sever the foreign ties and funding of local NGOs? There are, of course, many factors, varying across jurisdictions and time. The legacy of past transnational advocacy campaigns, we argue, is a significant-and often underestimatedreason. Frequently, during these campaigns, local NGOs in repressive and unresponsive states deploy what Keck and Sikkink (1998) refer to as the 'boomerang strategy', calling on international allies to pressure their government on their behalf. Transnational allies have used a variety of tactics, from generating negative media to lobbying diplomats to launching international legal cases. Harsh and swift state crackdowns often follow a boomerang throw, as seen by the murders of hundreds of indigenous and environmental activists every year (Human Rights Watch 2017) .
Especially in repressive states, politicians are also reframing past boomerang throws and ongoing participation in TANs as the workings of overseas interests, weakening domestic NGOs by portraying them as disloyal, subversive and even spies of foreign governments-working against national interests on behalf of foreign powers. Documenting this trend extends the theoretical understanding of the long-term consequences for domestic NGOs of participating in a TAN, especially those throwing boomerangs in repressive states. Most scholars portray joining a TAN as a way of increasing influence at home (see, for example, den Hond and de Bakker 2016; Katz and Anheier 2006, 247; McAteer and Pulver 2009) . Even those scholars complicating the analysis of TANs with a deeper understanding of the conflicts and differences within NGO communities focus on the value of the boomerang effect for promoting the causes of social movements rather than on the political consequences for social movements themselves (Bassano 2014) . The cases of post-Soviet Russia, India, Australia and others that we document show the power of states to turn the tables on domestic NGOs that accept money from foreign sources, throw 'boomerangs' internationally or otherwise participate in TANs.
We begin by explaining more fully the boomerang strategy and how transnational activism has come to shape local NGO activity around the world. Next, we sketch the global crackdown on NGOs, especially those campaigning against natural-resource extraction and seeking international allies to pressure their states. We examine in depth the cases of Russia, India and Australia to illustrate this trend and provide widespread evidence across different regime types. We conclude by reflecting on the politics of state framing of NGOs and the long-term political consequences for TANs working to advance environmental protection internationally.
The boomerang strategy and transnational activism
Throwing a boomerang, as Keck and Sikkink (1998, 12-13) describe, is a strategy that NGOs use to seek out international partners to lobby and pressure domestic leaders on their behalf. NGOs in the global South, especially ones with little funding and few staff, are most likely to deploy this strategy. International partnerships and transnational NGO coalitions can provide these NGOs with money, expertise and technology. Meanwhile, international NGO partners that grab hold of a boomerang are seen to be 'struggling with, and not only for, their southern partners' (Keck and Sikkink 1998, 13) . Hochstetler (2002) and Risse, Ropp and Sikkink (1999) help us understand how and why states under pressure from the toss of a boomerang tend to resent this NGO strategy, explaining state-NGO reactions and counter-reactions as a 'spiral model'. Generally, the process begins after a state suppresses a domestic NGO or campaign; in response, NGOs within this state turn to international allies to help pressure their state either directly or through the media or other states. Target states commonly push back and a long period of both domestic and international pressure can ensue. The willingness of states to reform policies or adopt new norms in response to international pressure varies widely, but at least in some instances the boomerang strategy has pushed 'inaccessible or deaf' states to retract decisions or alter tactics (Keck and Sikkink 1998, 13) . The transnational mobilisation against the construction of a water superhighway in the La Plata River basin in South America is a prominent example of a successful boomerang campaign (Hochstetler 2002) .
Transnational linkages, however, are not always beneficial to activists in repressive states. The consequences of transnational activism vary widely as activists interact with diverse and dynamic local campaigns, while NGO boomerangs often entail immediate short-term risks (Rootes 2006 (Rootes , 2008 Tarrow 2005) . Boomerangs affect local social and political dynamics, altering the relationship between domestic NGOs and the state, sometimes shifting the domestic balance of power (Paczynska 2004) . Transnational pressure may also contribute to rhetorical policy shifts that appease international critics but do little to promote institutional change (Neville 2015; Tarrow 2011; Tilly 2008) . Transnational activism in repressive states may further undermine opportunities for statesociety collaboration (Andonova 2014) . Moreover, as this article shows, while the boomerang effect may help a domestic campaign in the short term, in the long run boomerangs may rebound and harm local NGOs as states frame this strategy as unpatriotic, seditious and contrary to national interests.
In general, states use framing as an attempt at political manipulation, creating or inserting themselves into policy debates that shape the way in which the public understands specific issues (Lim and Seo 2009; Mintz and Redd 2003) . The prevailing state-framing literature tends to focus on short-term framing effects (Druckman 2001 (Druckman , 2011 Jacoby 2000; Sniderman and Theriault 2004) . This article, on the other hand, explores the long-term political goals and consequences of state framing. Labelling foreign-funded NGOs as the enemies of the state is unlikely to deflect international criticism. Such portrayals, however, can help states undermine the legitimacy and public support for domestic NGOs, as well as justify new laws to restrict foreign ties and foreign funding. We observe this pattern across the world.
'Regulatory offensive': controlling and suppressing NGOs worldwide Nearly half of all states have strengthened laws to control domestic NGOs, with the vast majority being passed since the mid 1990s in what Dupuy, Ron and Prakash (2015, 420, 423 ) call a 'regulatory offensive'. This trend is particularly prominent among low-and middle-income countries (Dupuy, Ron, and Prakash 2016) , but, as we later discuss, has been evident in high-income democracies as well. Restrictive laws targeting NGOs can be broadly grouped into the following five categories based on the ways in which organisations are targeted by a given state: administration, finance, communication, movement/ activity and harassment.
'Administration' refers to laws that discourage or prevent groups from creating NGOs and/or carrying out their activities (for example, burdensome registration and reporting procedures, organisational dissolution or prohibitions against unregistered groups). The 'finance' category includes regulations that restrict the ability of NGOs to secure necessary financial resources (for example, imposition of new taxes and fines, blocking of bank accounts or restrictions on foreign funding). 'Communication' refers to laws that prevent NGOs from engaging in free expression and advocacy, including information exchange and participation in networks (for example, through restricting the use of the Internet or criminalising dissent). The 'movement/activity' category includes laws that directly target NGOs' staff (for example, preventing local staff from travelling abroad or deporting foreign workers) and specific activities (for example, anti-protest laws). The last category captures government harassment of NGOs-for example, through raids, unannounced inspections or sudden requests for information. Table 1 presents a nonexhaustive list of different countries across the globe that have these types of laws in place. While many of them target human rights NGOs, environmental groups, especially those campaigning against natural-resource extraction, have become an increasingly frequent target of state backlash.
In addition to restrictive laws, governments have been increasingly using politically charged labels to target critics. For example, in Canada, the former Minister of Natural Resources, Joe Oliver, as well as the Royal Canadian Mounted Police labelled a number of groups opposed to oil pipelines and natural-resource extraction as 'foreign agents' and 'extremists ' (McCarthy 2012; Oliver 2017) . Similarly, in Bolivia, the administration of President Evo Morales has attacked ENGOs as counter-revolutionary agents of foreign capitalist interests (Achtenberg 2015; Hill 2017) . In Egypt, the post-Mubarak government has portrayed domestic NGOs with international ties as 'traitors', 'paid agents' and 'the weak of mind', claiming that foreign intelligence agencies have been disseminating information through NGOs to 'tarnish Egypt's reputation' (Pratt 2013, 115, 118) . Malaysia, Cambodia, Indonesia, Ecuador, China and other states are also employing a similar discourse of activists as 'agents of foreign interests' to suppress human rights and politically oriented NGOs (Cohen 2017; Huang 2017; Reaksmey 2015; Yin 2009 ).
Many different factors may explain this worldwide trend, including the 'war on terror' since the terrorist attacks in the USA on 11 September 2001, a backlash against foreign aid within developed countries, the challenges that increasingly powerful NGOs pose to sovereignty in repressive states, and authoritarian leaders looking to control foreign influences over domestic politics (Christensen and Weinstein 2013; Dauvergne and LeBaron 2014; Dupuy, Ron, and Prakash 2015) . Many leaders in these states specifically see the boomerang strategy as a political threat, and many of these laws are designed to turn the tables on NGOs with foreign funding and foreign allies, framing them as enemies of the national interest. It is beyond the scope of this article to examine fully the origins and reasons for the spread of these laws and labels across different countries. Instead, we focus on the consequences of the 'regulatory offensive' for global environmental activism. To this end, we have chosen three countries to examine in depth in order to demonstrate the harm that restrictive laws inflict on NGOs, as well as the long-term risks of throwing boomerangs. The three cases-Russia, India and Australia-represent three different types of state: non-democratic, rising democratic powers in the global South and high-income Western democracies. We begin with post-Soviet Russia.
Portraying NGOs as spies and agents of foreign interests in post-Soviet Russia
Russian NGOs first began to throw boomerangs in the early 1990s (Feldman and Blokov 2012) . Market and trade liberalisation under President Boris Yeltsin caused an economic crisis, a decline in social services and a rise in crime, corruption and poverty (Shevtsova 2007, 8-10) . When Vladimir Putin became Russia's second post-Soviet president in 2000, he promised to revitalise Russia's flagging economy (Henry 2010b, 42-43) . His strategy to revive the economy by promoting extractive and heavy industries was dubbed a 'dirty recovery' by critics; his administration was also criticised for other anti-environmental decisions (Crotty and Hall 2013, 668; Crotty and Rodgers n.d.; Yanitsky 2005, 369-370) . During this time, pervasive corruption, bureaucratisation and corporate noncompliance constrained the ability of Russian ENGOs to secure funding and influence state officials and the administration's course (Crotty and Rodgers n.d.; Henry 2010b, 33-34) . Under such conditions, transnational networks became essential funding sources for many Russian NGOs (Powell 2002) . These financial linkages have since expanded, with many Russian organisations collaborating with international allies to build support for domestic campaigns, especially those opposing nuclear energy and oil and gas projects (Feldman and Blokov 2012; Henry 2010a ). The Russian state has shown contempt for campaigns aimed at these particular sectors, claiming they are 'initiated by foreign intelligence agencies' and harm Russia's national security and economic interests (Antonova 2008 ). Russia's current NGO laws, and specifically the foreign agents law, have institutionalised this rhetoric and negative portrayal of activists. In 2006, President Putin signed Federal Law No. 18-FZ, tightening the registration and annual accounting rules for NGOs. Among other things, the government could now refuse to register any organisation that was deemed 'a threat to the sovereignty, political independence, territorial integrity, national unity, unique character, cultural heritage, and national interests of the Russian Federation' (Kamhi 2006, 41; see also Sova 2006) . Non-registered Russian NGOs could not open a bank account, buy property or negotiate legal contracts (Henry 2010b, 48) . Failing to register also made it harder for Russian NGOs to raise funds for projects and programs.
Despite some softening of the law during Dmitry Medvedev's presidency from 2008 to 2012 Ljubownikow 2014, 1254; Schmidt 2006) , just months after reassuming power, President Putin passed the foreign agents law that expanded the scope of the 2006 law, further constraining the financial, communication and administrative operations of NGOs (Amnesty International 2016). Once registered as a foreign agent, the 2012 law requires 'political' and 'foreign-funded' NGOs to label all media briefings (including Internet postings) with this designation. Other requirements similar to the 2006 law were added as well, including more extensive reporting and state oversight rules (Ljubownikow, Crotty, and Rodgers 2013, 161) . The 2012 law restricts the political activities of NGOs and gives the state the power to inspect, audit and investigate foreign agent NGOs through procedures such as the unscheduled site visits to which the environmental group Bellona-Murmansk has been subjected (Amnesty International 2016). Organisations that refuse to register as a foreign agent can be shut down (although appeals are possible), and face restrictions on participating in public rallies and accessing bank accounts. The legislation also gives the power to fine NGOs and impose prison sentences for violations (Album and Lorentzen 2014, 11; see also Machalek n.d.; Nikolskiy 2012) .
Despite criticism, amendments to the foreign agents law have only enhanced state powers over Russian NGOs. In February 2014, for example, President Putin signed into law a bill to expand the grounds for unscheduled compliance inspections of NGOs. A few months later, the Russian Parliament passed further amendments to allow for government inspections not only of NGOs listed in the registry of foreign agents, but also of any NGO that the government deemed to be a foreign agent (Shkel 2014) . Another law, passed in May 2015, targets 'foreign and international organisations undesirable in Russia' that 'represent a threat to the foundations of Russia's constitutional order, the country's defense or national security' (Interfax 2015; Melvin 2015) ; and still another legal amendment was made in 2016 to broaden the definition of 'political activity', increasing the scope of NGOs to which the law could be applied (Amnesty International 2016; Mukhametshina 2017; Slobodchikova 2016) .
Even prior to subsequent amendments, the 2006 NGO law gave the Russian state prodigious powers to control NGOs. The foreign agents law and amendments since 2012, and particularly the labels they entail, suggest that the primary objective is now to undermine the legitimacy, patriotism and power of any opposition to President Putin. NGOs that have previously engaged in TANs and thrown boomerangs are deemed especially undesirable by the Russian government. For example, Ecodefense, one of the most vocal opponents of Russia's nuclear sector and oil and gas development, was the first ENGO (and one of the first ten NGOs) in Russia to be labelled a foreign agent. The Russian government's anger with Ecodefense has been building for decades as the NGO has thrown boomerangs and launched international campaigns against natural-resource extraction. For example, in 1996, Ecodefense campaigned to block a ship carrying uranium from entering Kaliningrad; in the 1990s and 2000s, Ecodefense protested against the construction of an oil terminal and nuclear plant in Kaliningrad; and more recently it has been opposing nuclear imports from Europe (see, for example, Digges 2014; Josephson et al. 2013, 306) .
Another prominent ENGO added to the foreign agents list in 2013 was Baikal Environmental Wave, a local organisation that was largely responsible for throwing a boomerang internationally during the anti-Transneft Pipeline campaign in the mid 2000s (Feldman and Blokov 2012; Goldman Environmental Foundation 2013) . The Siberian Environmental Center, a conservationist group based in southern Siberia, was labelled a foreign agent in 2015. Earlier, local prosecutors searched its offices to link the ENGO to Greenpeace's 'Arctic 30' campaign, where Russian authorities arrested and imprisoned a group of activists for scaling a Gazprom oil rig in the Arctic (Vandysheva 2015) . Such actions by the Russian government are consistent with its long-standing effort to thwart any local-international environmental cooperation to shine an international spotlight on the consequences of Russia's energy production.
A decade ago, Henry and Douhovnikoff (2008, 450) saw environmentalists as one of the few civil society groups in Russia able to challenge the state. The government's backlash against domestic NGOs with foreign ties is clearly weakening this capacity. In this context, Russian ecologists have been beaten and assaulted, with some seeking political asylum in Europe after criticising government corruption and environmental mismanagement (Usov 2012, 115-116; Vidal 2014) . The tightening of Russian NGO laws will further limit the use of confrontational and political tactics by transnational networks advocating in Russia, including the use of the boomerang strategy. Similar state tactics are apparent in other countries where economic and political successes are linked to environmentally destructive activities. As exemplified by the following cases of India and Australia, regardless of political regime, targeting domestic ENGOs that participate in TANs as 'foreign agents' is an effective way to subvert international environmental activism.
'Foreign agents' and threats to development: framing environmentalists in India
The link between India's economy of resource extraction and laws designed to curtail ENGOs' activities cannot be separated from the country's colonial history. Even though British colonisation is at the root of India's support for extractive industries as a source of state wealth, the post-colonial governments have continued down the path of resource extraction to alleviate poverty and increase national wealth (Ghosh 2016; Swain 1997) . Concurrently, wishing to stimulate civil society and democratic consolidation, the government in the late 1940s facilitated the development of Indian civil society (de Souza 2010). Some domestic NGOs, however, have begun to oppose the state's economic interests in extractive industries, drawing government disdain and a subsequent tightening of regulations that govern NGOs' activities.
Since the 1970s, civil society organisations in India have been increasingly facing a backlash as the government has introduced measures to obstruct foreign-affiliated NGOs from operating in the country. In 1976, the government, headed by Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, passed the Foreign Contribution Regulation Act (FCRA), which was designed to regulate foreign contributions to political campaigns. It was an attempt to resolve the economic development and environmental justice issues that were at the forefront of India's politics in the late 1970s (Bornstein and Sharma 2016, 79) . At the time, major natural-resource projects, such as the Sardar Sarovar hydroelectric dam, spurred the rise of local environmental groups, which then threw boomerangs and attracted attention from transnational environmental activists in the global North (Rodrigues 2004, 115-128) .
Since the 1970s, the FCRA has been amended several times to require all foreign NGOs to register with the government and make all financial and staff information available to India's Intelligence Bureau (Singh 2015) . The financial disclosure requirements have been strictly enforced, with the government freezing the bank accounts of nearly 9000 NGOs, and with international NGOs such as the Sierra Club and the Ford Foundation placed on a watch list that requires them to seek governmental approval for all of their activities within India (Al Jazeera 2015; Lakshmi 2015b). These laws have also allowed the government to cancel or not renew the licenses of thousands of NGOs (Jain 2016) . As a result, the number of foreign-affiliated NGOs registered under the FCRA fell to roughly 20,000 in 2016, from the 33,158 registered the previous year (ibid.).
This latest crackdown in India can be traced to a 2014 report by the Intelligence Bureau which claimed that international NGOs, such as Greenpeace and Amnesty International, were responsible for a 2-3 percent loss in India's annual gross domestic product (Doane 2016) . The report linked international NGOs to domestic counterparts, thus holding TANs advocating against major development projects, such as coal and nuclear energy, responsible for harming India's economic security (Times of India 2014). The report further suggested that NGOs which harm the Indian economy are not operating in India's national interest but instead are 'serving as foreign policy tools of Western governments' (Doane 2016; Human Rights Watch 2016) .
In particular, the Indian government has portrayed Greenpeace as a foreign agent that is obstructing economic growth by organising local opposition to coal mining across the country (Rowlatt 2015) . The government has framed Greenpeace India as an organisation funded by foreign interests and harming the 'economic interests of the state' (Lakshmi 2015a) , even though the organisation is funded primarily by domestic sources and does not accept corporate or governmental money. The government has frozen Greenpeace India's accounts and blocked foreign funding for months at a time (Lakshmi 2015b) . Further, the government prevented Indian Greenpeace activist Priya Pillai from travelling to the United Kingdom to speak to legislators regarding British investment in India's mining sector (Vaughan and Vidal 2015) . Meanwhile, foreign Greenpeace activists have been barred from entering India, and the police have put the organisation's offices under surveillance (Subramanian 2015) .
Despite international condemnation, including reports from the United Nations urging India to repeal the FCRA, the current government of Prime Minister Narendra Modi continues to target NGOs that receive foreign funding (Human Rights Watch 2017; Mohanty 2016). The framing of NGOs as foreign agents in India has latched onto anticolonial sentiments held by many citizens, who feel that foreign-affiliated environmentalists represent Western interests (Doshi 2016) . The Indian government has continued to welcome foreign investment in extractive industries while targeting foreign-funded ENGOs and limiting the ability of environmental activists to participate in TANs (Ghosh 2016) . Laws, regulations and rhetoric targeting NGOs in India often draw direct connections between environmental TANs, foreign interference and economic development, placing environmental activists in a position where boomerangs are less effective and domestic support can be characterised as unpatriotic. Connoting environmentalism with colonialism can be seen elsewhere in the global South as resource-rich countries seek to protect their economic interests from Western-funded transnational environmentalists (Mitchell 2016, 98 ). Yet, just as governments in the global South attempt to limit the influence of NGOs funded by or based in the global North, Western states, too, have targeted environmental organisations and activists who oppose their resource-extraction policies.
Environmentalists as 'extremists' in Australia
In recent years, Australia has also enacted policies to impede ENGOs that are opposed to natural-resource extraction (Staples 2014) . As the country seeks to increase investment in its mining sector, politicians have enacted policies to curb the activities of environmental organisations, framed environmental activists as extremists, and suggested that TANs are undermining democratic processes (Kelly 2017; Shanahan 2016) .
Transnational environmental activism is a well-established aspect of Australian civil society. McConville (2015) , for example, notes the importance of TANs in the formation of Australian ENGOs during the 1960s and 1970s. Others have also argued that foreign (and especially American) environmental ideas and policies have significantly shaped Australian environmentalism (Rootes 2015; Sauter 2015) . In their opposition to resource extraction, domestic organisations have historically relied on inspiration and assistance from foreign environmentalists (McConville 2015, 388) .
The government under Prime Minister John Howard (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) began stifling environmental organisations and institutions that disagreed with its policies (Star 2016) . Later, under the leadership of Tony Abbott (2013-15), the Australian government challenged the tax-deductible status of NGOs conducting what it framed as political advocacy (Aston 2015) . Policies that remove the tax-deductible status of these organisations in effect reduce the incentives for citizen donations, negatively affecting the ability of ENGOs to solicit domestic funding. Despite the hopes of environmental groups, the current government, headed by Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull, has pursued an inquiry into the taxdeductible status of ENGOs (Slezak 2017) . Some of the recommendations, such as the requirement that ENGOs spend 25 percent of their revenue on environmental remediation (Australian Government 2017, 13) , are likely to hinder ENGOs' operations significantly.
The Turnbull government has also expressed its intention to introduce legislation to ban foreign donations to Australian ENGOs (Murphy 2017; SBS Wires 2017) . In addition, in 2017 then Attorney General George Brandis proposed amendments to Australia's espionage and foreign influence laws, arguing that 'the threat of covert foreign interference is a threat of the highest order' (SBS Wires 2017). Such efforts are largely a product of a widespread perception within the current government that foreign-funded environmental extremists are challenging the country's economy and democracy (Aston 2015; Readfearn 2016) .
As in Russia and India, Australian ENGOs that are opposed to natural-resource extraction have been framed as agents undermining Australia's national interests. Newspapers with right-wing leanings have drawn connections between foreign-funded NGOs and interference in Australian elections, while politicians such as Senator Linda Reynolds have stated that funding from foreign sources poses a threat to Australia's electoral system (Kelly 2017) . Other Australian politicians have suggested that foreign-funded environmentalists are responsible for blocking Indian investment in Australia's coalmining industry, with Tony Abbott maintaining that 'this is a most pernicious case of foreign influence in our investments' (Shanahan and McKenna 2016) .
In an overlap of transnational boomerangs and backlash against NGOs, the Indian coal company Adina Mining claimed that the ENGOs protesting against its proposed mine near the Great Barrier Reef were attacking Australia's 'attractiveness as a place to do business' (Smyth 2015) . This comment was made just as an Australian Aboriginal group was touring Europe to garner support for its campaign against Adina's project, exemplifying how corporations and governments perceive their vulnerability to TANs and seek to limit the ability of NGOs to throw boomerangs and participate in TANs (McAteer and Pulver 2009; Smyth 2015) . Shortly after, the government released a 'radicalisation awareness kit' (launched by the Minister for Justice, Michael Keenan) to 'help teachers look out for signs of radicalisation in their students' (Australian Government 2015; see also Jabour 2015) . Through a politically charged case study, this kit links environmental activism with extremism.
Portraying environmental activists as extremists has enabled the government to target ENGOs as foreign-funded organisations that pose a danger to Australian sovereignty. Indeed, references by politicians to a 'cabal' (Kelly 2017) of environmental activists undermining the economy with foreign money, coupled with inquiries into the charitable status of NGOs and legislation designed to ban international donations, are likely to effectively restrict the ability of Australian ENGOs to carry out their activities and participate in TANs.
Conclusion
The pervasive treatment of NGOs as foreign agents in Russia, India and Australia provides a window onto a worldwide backlash against the activities of TANs, particularly the use of the boomerang strategy as a way for local ENGOs to pressure states. In such states, the long-term political consequences for local NGOs of participating in a TAN and throwing boomerangs clearly depend not only on whether those in power see this as an immediate political threat, but also on whether, over time, political elites frame the history of NGOs reaching out to international allies for funding and assistance as a betrayal of national interests. By legislating NGO participation in TANs as 'unpatriotic' and the work of foreign agents, more and more states are retelling this history to justify new laws to further force local NGOs into submission and delegitimise environmental activism. This trend has several long-term implications for environmental activism, both domestically and globally: growing operational constraints, declining public support and reach, greater fragmentation of domestic civil society and increasing international isolation.
Those NGOs that register as foreign agents or are publicly labelled as working in the interest of foreigners are likely to experience operational constraints and social stigma. Strict laws concerning NGO registration rules give the state significant control over NGO funding and activities. Particularly concerning is the ability of the state to refuse to register any group that is deemed 'undesirable'. Strict reporting rules effectively bar anonymous donations and make public fundraising exceedingly difficult (Kamhi 2006, 36) . Increased bureaucratisation also forces NGOs to spend even more time on paperwork, and thus less time organising and campaigning. If combined with small budgets and small memberships, the administrative burden is likely to weaken many NGOs permanently (Crotty and Rodgers n.d.) .
The social stigma that usually accompanies the 'foreign agent' (or other) designation is likely to further complicate NGOs' efforts at home. For example, in Russia, ENGOs have been refusing to register voluntarily as foreign agents because 'they consider themselves working for Russian interests; for the Russian nature and the health and environmental safety of Russian citizens' (Album and Lorentzen 2014, 10 ; see also Human Rights Watch 2015). Many ENGOs in Russia are understandably afraid that accepting this label will undermine their public credibility (Album and Lorentzen 2014, 11; Savitskiy n.d.) . The Russian lawyer Stefania Kulaeva has come to believe that 'as soon as an NGO is in the registry, it becomes an outcast' and 'our long-term partners-even such neutral ones as schools and libraries-have refused to work with us' (Bocharova and Ulyanova 2014) . State framing and NGO laws further contribute to growing divisions among the domestic civil society.
Many analysts are concerned that organisations refusing to register as a foreign agent are empowering the state to shutter independent and fault-finding NGOs (Sofronova, Holley, and Nagarajan 2014; Solomon 2015) . In Russia, President Putin seems to be using the NGO laws to co-opt civil society, delegitimising critics and legitimising apologists. Similar manoeuvres have been made in countries such as Bolivia and India. Religious groups, corporations and business associations are also less likely to fall prey to foreign agents laws, as seen in the relative freedom of expression granted to transnational extractive resource companies in many states (Achtenberg 2017; Smyth 2015) .
In addition, as many governments have come to realise, curtailing the international funding of local NGOs is an especially effective way of reducing local contact with transnational networks (Christensen and Weinstein 2013; Nilsen 2017) . As others have found, a small number of networks link most international NGOs (Katz and Anheier 2006, 256-257) , and local NGOs without regular contact with at least one of these networks have far less ability to throw boomerangs internationally. With international funding eliminated or severely restricted, environmental groups are likely to gravitate towards local projects and issues-a shift that could perhaps raise public participation in domestic environmental movements.
The trend we document, however, suggests a future of depoliticisation of the global environmental movement. Although the passing of harsh NGO laws has sparked an international outcry, in the future, international NGOs may be more reluctant to grab hold of boomerangs thrown by activists in repressive states, worrying that these states will lash out even harder at NGOs with foreign ties. This conclusion does not bode well for the future influence and safety of local TAN members seeking environmental justice. Note 1. We use the terms 'framing' and 'labelling' synonymously; however, we recognise that framing is a more complicated activity than simply creating and assigning labels (see, for example, Scheufele and Iyengar 2014).
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